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A Real-Time Information Based Demand-Side
Management System in Smart Grid
Feng Ye, Student Member, IEEE, Yi Qian, Senior Member, IEEE, and Rose Qingyang Hu, Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract—In this paper, we study a real-time information
based demand-side management (DSM) system with advanced
communication networks in smart grid. DSM can smooth peakto-average ratio (PAR) of power usage in the grid, which in turn
reduces the waste of fuel and the emission of greenhouse gas.
We first target to minimize PAR with a centralized scheme. To
motivate power suppliers, we further propose another centralized
scheme targeting minimum power generation cost. However,
customers may not be motivated by a centralized scheme since
such a scheme requires total control and privacy from them.
A centralized scheme also requires too much real-time data
exchange for frequent DSM deployment. To tackle these issues,
we propose game theoretical approaches so that most of the
computation is performed locally. In the proposed game, all
the customers are motivated by extra savings if participating.
Moreover, we prove that all parties benefit from the DSM system
to the same level because both the centralized schemes and
the game theoretical approach minimize global PAR. Such an
analysis is further demonstrated by the simulation results and
discussions. Additionally, we evaluate the performance of several
(partially) distributed approaches in order to find the best way
to deploy DSM system.
Index Terms—smart grid, demand-side management system,
peak-to-average ratio

I. I NTRODUCTION
The world has been changing revolutionarily towards a
higher efficiency in many aspects due to the fast pace advancements of communication technologies. Among them,
traditional power grid is evolving to smart grid lately based
on two-way communication networks that connect service
providers and customers [1]–[3]. For example, the advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI) [4], [5] equips each customer
with a smart meter, whose basic function is to gather the
energy consumption status and upload the information to the
control center (also known as power distributer or service
provider). A smart meter is also capable of receiving control
information (e.g., price and tariff bills) from the control center.
Such a two-way information exchange is assumed to be near
real-time ultimately [4].
A demand-side management (DSM, also known as demand
response) system [6]–[8] further utilizes real-time information
in order to let power grid generate and consume energy
more efficiently while reducing unnecessary waste. A DSM
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system is widely agreed to be effective on reducing the peakto-average ratio (PAR) of energy consumption [7]–[9]. This
improvement helps power suppliers reduce extra fuel cost
caused by dramatic and unpredictable margin fluctuations in
power generation. Less fuel burning also helps reduce emission of greenhouse gas from those power generators. Moreover, since the control center gets the energy consumption
schedule beforehand [10]–[13], the renewable sources such as
photovoltaics (PV) farm and wind turbine field, which are less
stable and less controllable compared with the conventional
power generators, can support power grid more efficiently.
A higher proportion of such renewable sources will further
reduce fuel burning from the conventional power generators.
In this paper, we first propose a centralized optimization
problem P1 in order to reduce PAR to its minimum. Although
a minimum PAR is obviously beneficial to the environment,
however, it motivates neither power suppliers nor customers.
Especially power suppliers must deploy and maintain a more
complicated cyber system than what AMI can offer to gather
and distribute a huge amount of detailed information in real
time. Therefore, a monetary incentive is needed to motivate
power suppliers. Another centralized optimization problem P2
is then proposed to reduce the total energy generating cost of
power suppliers. Although power suppliers may be willing to
adopt the DSM system based on P2, it is based on direct
load control (DLC) [10], [14], [15], which could be defective.
In terms of communications, even if the massive centralized
problem can be solved efficiently, the transmission overhead
will lay a huge burden on the communication network and
require more advanced technical upgrade as well as more
frequent maintenance. Moreover, the customers could be reluctant to adopt such a DSM system for two reasons. One reason
is that the control center takes over the energy consumption
scheduling from customers with no clear incentive for them to
do so. The other reason is that DLC requires too much privacy
from the customers.
To tackle those issues, we must have a DSM system that
clearly benefits customers, protects their privacy, and requires
much less real-time information exchange compared with P1
or P2. We formulate a game with two approaches based on
smart pricing, which is another major technique applied to the
DSM system. In one approach, the customers get to compute
the dynamic price based on their own load schedule with the
total load of the power grid given. In the other approach, the
control center computes the price based on the total load of the
power grid and customers get that fixed price schedule that will
not be affected by their local scheduling load. In either game
theoretical approach, the payoff functions lead customer to a
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more energy cost saving. Therefore, customers are motivated
to adopt this DSM system. In addition, customers reserve the
rights to control their power consumption, and by doing so,
they keep the privacy to themselves by submitting only the
energy consumption schedule, which is always a request even
in traditional power grid. Moreover, since most of the calculation is performed locally at the customer side, the approaches
are mostly distributed instead of centralized. The distributed
game theoretical approach largely relieves the transmission
overhead. More importantly, we prove that all P1, P2 and
game theoretical approach with locally computed dynamic
smart pricing lead to the same minimum PAR. Therefore,
while all parties get enough motivation to participate, the DSM
system can be deployed in a distributed way.
We summarize the main contributions in the following.
• In order to benefit the entire society and the environment,
we propose a DLC based centralized approach to minimizing the PAR.
• In order to show the benefits to the power suppliers,
we propose another DLC based centralized approach to
minimizing the power generation cost, and the power
generation cost model considers all conventional, nonexpanding green energy sources, and expanding renewable energy sources.
• In order to motivate the customers to adopt the DSM
system and protect their privacy, we propose smart pricing
based game theoretical approaches that can maximize
the customer savings by adopting such a DSM sytem.
The game theoretical approaches are mostly distributed
and thus they alleviate the communication burden of the
network.
• We prove that the proposed DLC based and one of
the smart pricing based distributed game theoretical approaches yield to the same optimal solution (minimum
PAR), and therefore the distributed game theoretical
approach can be applied for real application while all
parties observe clear benefits from the DSM system.
• We provide extensive numerical analysis and simulation
results to demonstrate our analysis. We also compare
several distributed approaches in order to find the best
way to deploy the DSM system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we discuss the related work. In section III, we illustrate the
DSM system under study in this paper. In section IV, we
formulate and analyze two centralized optimization problems,
as well as several game based distributed approaches. In
section V we show the numerical analysis and simulation
results. And finally we conclude the work in section VI.
II. R ELATED W ORK
DSM in smart grid has been studied by many researches
recently [6]–[13], [16], [17]. However, most of the works focus
on one of the parties (e.g., power suppliers when applying
DLC or customers when adopting smart pricing) in the system
only, without clarification on why to overlook others. Game
theoretical approach and smart pricing have also been widely
adopted in most of the works as efficient approaches. The

most related work to this paper includes [7], [8], [10]. The
authors of [7] proposed a non-cooperative game played among
residential customers, and a two-stage Stackelberg game theoretical approach where power suppliers as the leaders tend
to maximize their profit and customers as the followers tend
to minimize their cost. Since [7] mostly targeted residential
customers, the benefits for other parties in the system were not
clearly stated, and some impractical situation where the total
load goes negative was carefully avoided. In [8], the authors
proposed an efficient game theoretical approach for residential
customers without storage unit based on dynamic smart pricing
to reduce the PAR. While the computational efficiency was
demonstrated, the global optimal PAR was not guaranteed by
the distributed approach. The authors of [10] are among of the
first to minimize PAR by distributed game theoretical approach
among customers. Similarly, the storage unit was considered
as their future work, and the global optimal PAR was not
guaranteed.
III. S YSTEM M ODEL
A. The Demand-Side Power Management System
Control center

Communication
link
Power line

Wind turbine
Conventional

Residential
Business

Hydroelectric
PV
Nuclear

Fig. 1.

Industrial

Demand-side power management system.

The demand-side power management (DSM) system under
study mainly consists of three parties, namely control center,
power suppliers, and customers, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Power generators include all major types, from fuel consuming
conventional power generators to renewable power generators.
For simplicity, micro grid that can be attached/detached to the
power grid is not considered, and customers do not have power
generators. Control center is mainly responsible for power
distribution. It also gathers data (e.g., energy consumption)
and distributes control information (e.g., price, tariff and
emergency control signal). The information is available due
to a two-way communication network in the DSM system. At
each customer side, there is a smart meter that is responsible
for reporting the power consumption and possible scheduling
to the control center through the communication network. It
is also responsible for receiving price, tariff as well as other
control information from the control center.
According to [18], major customers in U.S.A. include
residential, business and industrial ones as shown in Fig. 2.
Those customers have different characteristics when consuming electric energy. For example, residential customers may
consume most of the power from afternoon through midnight, business customers consume most of the energy during
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for each time interval. Moreover, each appliance ain also has
a pre-determined energy requirement Eni for a time period
(assuming one day for simplicity). Therefore, for ain , it must
satisfy
1T xin = Eni ,
(1)
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office hours, while industrial customers may have a longer
peak consumption schedule due to different but continuous
shifts. The deployment of energy storage units and popularity
of plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEV) are increasing rapidly.
Such devices/appliances will increase energy consumption and
change the current peak time schedule. For example, it is
reasonable to assume most of the customers will charge their
PHEV during the night time. For simplicity, PHEV is observed
as a hybrid of a normal energy consuming appliance and an
energy storage unit in the studied DSM system.
B. Mathematical Modeling
Table I lists the key notations of sets and variables we use
throughout the paper. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , N } be the set of
all customers, where N , |N | is the total number customers.
Although the DSM system can be modeled for any arbitrary
time period to satisfy the assumptions, we consider a daily
model in this work without loss of generality. Let one day be
divided into several uniform time intervals, denoted as T =
{1, 2, . . . , |T |}.
TABLE I
K EY SETS AND VARIABLES .
Global
N = {1, 2, . . . , N }
T = {1, 2, . . . , |T |}
L = {L(t)|t ∈ T }
C = {C(L(t))|t ∈ T }
p = {p(L(t))|t ∈ T }
Local (for customer n)
n
an = {a1n , a2n , . . . , aA
n }
xin = {xin (t)|t ∈ T }
i |i ≤ A }
En = {En
n
tin = {0, 1}|T |
−
s−
n = {sn (t)|t ∈ T }
+
s+
n = {sn (t)|t ∈ T }
ln = {ln (t)|t ∈ T }

set of customers
set of time intervals
daily energy consumption scheduling
set of total cost for each time interval
set of unit price for each time interval
set of appliances
daily energy scheduling set of ain
Energy requirement set
on/off operating scheduling set of ain
discharging scheduling of storage unit
charging scheduling of storage unit
daily energy consumption scheduling set

Each customer n has a set of appliances an =
n
{a1n , . . . , aA
n }, where An , |an |. Each appliance (e.g.,
i
an ) has a daily energy consumption scheduling set xin =
{xin (t)|t ∈ T }, which records the needed or consumed energy

where 1 is a column vector of 1s and (·)T calculates the
transposition. Appliance ain has an on/off operating scheduling
set tin = {0, 1}|T | , where 1 indicates that ain is allowed
to operate whereas 0 indicates off status of ain . The on/off
operating schedule can model the operating status more precisely than the model using an operating time period, which
is more widely adopted [7], [8], [10]. For example, with
an on/off operating schedule, it is able to model a 2-hour
pause of an air-conditioning (AC). However, if modeled by
the operating time period, it must break the time period into
three co-related sessions with extra constraints. With the on/off
operating scheduling set tin , Eq. 1 can be rewritten into
(tin )T xin = Eni .

(2)

For an appliance which needs to be used for several
times daily (e.g., a coffee machine), it can be observed as
multiple independent appliances with corresponding energy
requirements and on/off schedules. For this reason, we want to
emphasize that An may not necessarily be the exact number
of appliances of customer n but the number that counts
independent appliances.
When ain is operating, its energy consumption is bounded
min
max
by γn,i
and γn,i
, and mathematically,
min i
max i
γn,i
tn  xin  γn,i
tn .

(3)

Besides the appliances, let each customer (e.g., n) be
equipped with an energy storage unit with a design capacity s̄n . For simplicity, we assume that the storage unit has
100% discharging/charging efficiency, and the energy can be
distributed for all the appliances within the power grid with
100% efficiency. In other words, the storage units can be used
to support the appliances of customers themselves as well as
−
to sell the energy to the power grid. Let s−
n = {sn (t)|t ∈ T }
+
+
be the discharging scheduling set, and let sn = {sn (t)|t ∈ T }
be the charging scheduling set. Similar to the appliance energy
consumption, the discharging/charging energy in each time
max
interval is bounded by the safety thresholds smax
n− /sn+ , which
are expressed as
max
0  s−
n  sn− 1,

(4)

max
0  s+
n  sn+ 1.

(5)

To be more precise, the storage unit should not discharge
and charge at the same time for efficiency, so we have
+
s−
n ◦ sn = 0,

(6)

where “◦” is the entrywise/Hadamard product, and 0 is the
column vector with all 0s. Eq. 6 will help convert the storage
unit model into a lossy one easily.
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Let sn = {sn (t)|t ∈ T } be the set of remaining energy at
the beginning of each time interval,
(
s̃n ,
t=1
sn (t) =
−
+
sn (t − 1) − sn (t − 1) + sn (t − 1), t =∈ T \{1}
(7)
where s̃n is the initial remaining capacity. Let s̄n be the
designed capacity of the storage unit, then
0 ≤ s̃n ≤ s̄n ,

(8)

+
0  sn − s−
n + sn  s̄n 1.

(9)

Let the daily energy consumption schedule for customer n
be ln = {ln (t)|t ∈ T }. With the previous modeling, we now
have
An
X

+
xin − s−
(10)
ln =
n + sn .
i=1

For the whole DSM power system, the global load schedule
L = {L(t)|t ∈ T } is calculated as
L=

N
X

ln .

•

Fuel consuming conventional generators: a quadratic cost
function is widely adopted for this type of generators [6]–
[10] as
Cc (l) = ac l2 + bc l + cc .
(12)

•

Non-expandable green sources: assuming the produced
energy is predetermined by the fixed facilities, the total
cost can be viewed as a fixed cost cf plus a linear cost
w.r.t power transmission capacity as
Cf (l) = af l + cf .

•

(13)

Expandable renewable sources: since most of the cost
comes from the management of the facilities [20], by
assuming the facilities can be on/off based on the load
requirement, the total cost is increasing w.r.t the load requirement. However it increases slower than the conventional generators [21], especially when carbon tax [22]
applies. Therefore we adopt the following cost model for
expandable renewable sources.
Cr (l) = ar l ln(l + 1) + cr .

(14)

Taking into consideration the proportions of all the generators/sources, the overall energy cost is modeled as,

(11)
C(l) = Cc (βc l) + Cf (βf l) + Cr (βr l),

i=1

C. Energy Cost and Unit Price
Based on [19], power suppliers are categorized into three
types, namely fuel (e.g., coal) consuming conventional generators, non-expandable green sources (hydroelectric, nuclear),
and expandable renewable sources (PV field, wind farm). The
net capacity of those generators/sources is shown in Fig. 3.
Conventional generators are still the major energy producers,
however their proportion is decreasing. The proportion of
non-expandable generators is slowly decreasing since the
total energy is increasing. Although the proportion of the
expandable renewable energy is low, it is increasing in a faster
pace. Therefore, we need to take into consideration all three
categories of power suppliers for a more precise modeling.

(15)

where βc , βf and βr are the proportions of three power
suppliers respectively, and βc + βf + βr = 1. Let C =
{C(L(t))|t ∈ T } be the set of total cost for each time interval.
At the customer side, the unit price ($ per kW h) is more
important than the total cost. For simplicity, let the energy be
generated uniformly during a time period, the unit price is
calculated as
p(l) = Ċ(l) = C(l)/l.
(16)
Finally let p = {p(L(t))|t ∈ T } be the set of unit prices
for each time interval.
IV. P ROBLEM F ORMULATION

AND

A NALYSIS

A. Minimize PAR
One of the ultimate goals of applying DSM is to reduce the
peak-to-average ratio, which raises the first problem:

Proportion to total energy (%).

80
70
60
50
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Non−expandable green
Expandable renewable
others

min

supt∈T L
1
T
|T | (1 L)

(17)

s.t. Constraints (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), ∀n ∈ N
Constraint (11).

40

Lemma 1. Let L be the set of all possible daily load scheduling patterns (L is convex because of the convex, compact
and non-empty constraints). Then P1 has a unique optimal
solution L⋆1 = arg min(supL), ∀L ∈ L.
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Proof: First, since all appliances (including the storage
units) consume energy from the power generators/sources, and
each appliance has a daily energy requirement, thus the daily
total load 1T L = Γ is observed as a constant. Therefore
P1 , P1.1 : min sup L
t∈T
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with the same constraints. Let the objective function for P1.1
be f (L) = sup{L(t)|t ∈ T }, which satisfies, for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1,
t∈T

f (θL1 + (1 − θ)L2 ) = sup(θL1 (t) + (1 − θ)L2 (t))
t

≤θ sup L1 (t) + (1 − θ) sup L2 (t) (18)
t

t

Thus f (L) is convex. Additionally, the constraint set is
compact, convex and non-empty. Therefore, P1.1 has a unique
solution L⋆1 and does P1.
Note that although the existence of an optimal solution
always stands, the uniqueness of the solution only stands when
L is considered as the variable set because multiple solutions
to Eq. 11 may exist with a given L. Although minimizing PAR
is a benevolent objective, it may not be convincing enough for
power suppliers or customers to adopt such a DSM system.
For this reason, we further formulate another problem with a
monetary incentive objective function.

B. Minimize Total Cost
In the electricity energy market, power generators/sources
are not fully competitive to each other yet since some of the
technologies are still too expensive to apply and they operate
based on government subsidy [23]. Moreover, sophisticated
regulatory mechanisms are needed to avoid arbitrarily high
price led by monopoly and rigid electric energy demand.
Therefore, we focus on a cost-oriented instead of profitoriented objective. In short, P2 minimizes the total cost of
the power suppliers, such that
min pT L

v

t∈T

(21)

=θf (L1 ) + (1 − θ)f (L2 )

P2 :

T } to P2 is calculated as
)
(




P max

∂g(L)
⋆
⋆

, ∀t ∈ T
sn− , arg ∂L(t) + v
 L2 (t) = max −
n∈N

 L(t)

P ⋆


L2 (t) = Γ .
 v ⋆ = arg

(19)

Note that solution in Eq. 21 is unique w.r.t L and it may
have multiple solutions w.r.t the detailed energy consumption
scheduling patterns to all the appliances.
Lemma 4. If L⋆ is the optimal solution to P1, it is also the
optimal solution to P2.
Proof: Let x = {xt |t ∈ T } , L⋆1 be the optimal solution
of P1, and let y = {yt |t ∈ T } , L⋆2 be the optimal solution of
P2 in this proof. Also, reorganize x, y to be non-descending
sets such that xi ≤ xi+1 , yi ≤ yi+1 , i ∈ T for better
illustration. Note that supt x = x|T |, and supt y = y|T |. We
then prove this lemma by contradictory. Assuming x 6= y,
then it must be
x|T | < y|T |
(22)
X
X
xi p(xi ) >
yi p(yi )
(23)
i∈T

i∈T

Furthermore, inequality (23) indicates that
X
(xi p(xi ) − yi p(yi )) > y|T | p(y|T | ) − x|T | p(x|T | )

i∈T \{|T |}

(24)

The left hand side of inequality (24) is maximized when
xi = yi = 0, i ∈ T \{T |} since 1T x = 1T y = 1T L = Γ is
the daily total load and function g(x) = xp(x) is increasing
and strict convex w.r.t x, we have

s.t. Constraints (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), ∀n ∈ N
Constraint (11).
Lemma 2. P2 has a unique optimal solution L⋆2
arg min pT L, ∀L ∈ L.
Proof: The objective function of P2 is
X
X
pT L =
(p (L(t)) L(t)) =
C (L(t))
t

=

(Γ − x|T | )p(Γ − x|T | ) − (Γ − y|T | )p((Γ − y|T | ))


X
(xi p(xi ) − yi p(yi ))
≥ sup 
x,y∈L

(20)

t∈T

For simplicity, let x , L(t) be the argument in this proof.
It is obvious that C(x) is increasing and
Pstrict convex. Since
Eq. 20 is a composition of C(x), thus t∈T (p(L(t)) · L(t))
is strict convex w.r.t L(t). With the same compact, convex
and non-empty constraint set compared to P1, P2 thus has a
unique optimal solution.
Let function g(L) , pT L. Then the optimal solution to P2
can be found by solving the necessary and sufficient conditions
of KKT [24].
Lemma 3. Let v be the Lagrange multiplier of the equality
constraint of P2 (1T L = Γ), and let v ⋆ minimize the dual
problem of P2 over v. The optimal solution L⋆2 = {L⋆2 (t)|t ∈

(25)

i∈T \{|T |}

(Note that we apply supreme instead of maximum in inequality (25) for the reason that the maximum value may
not be achieved if xi 6= 0 for some i.) However, because
of inequality (22), then
x|T |−1 ≤ Γ − x|T | < x|T |
y|T |−1 ≤ Γ − y|T | < y|T |

(26)

Γ − x|T | − Γ − y|T | = y|T | − x|T |

(27)

and the fact that

We must then have
X
sup
x,y∈L

(xi p(xi ) − yi p(yi ))

i∈T \{|T |}

≤(Γ − x|T | )p(Γ − x|T | ) − (Γ − y|T | )p(Γ − y|T | )
≤y|T | p(y|T | ) − x|T | p(x|T | )

(28)
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Note that inequality (28) contradicts inequality (24), and
thus x = y (or L⋆1 = L⋆2 = L⋆ after proper ordering), which
completes the proof.
Theorem 1. Minimizing the total cost reaches the minimum
PAR: P2 , P1.
Although power suppliers may be willing to adopt a DSM
system according to P2 so that they can reduce their total
cost, it still has three major issues to solve for either P1 or
P2. Customer privacy is the first issue. Since both P1 and
P2 are exclusively executed at the control center side (often
regarded as DLC schemes), all the customers must submit their
detailed information to the control center and willingly let the
control center schedule their power usage. The incentive for
the customers to adopt a DSM system is the second issue.
Although a DSM system smooths PAR and reduces the total
cost, it is not clear whether customers can benefit from P1 or
P2 or not. Third, both P1 and P2 are centralized optimization
problems, which can get quite complicated and computationconsuming to solve. Even if the problems can be solved
efficiently, the huge overhead of raw data gathering lays too
much burden on the communication network. Therefore, we
need a distributed DSM system that also protects the customers
by letting them control their own appliances.
C. Game Theoretical Approaches
Smart pricing is another widely adopted cost strategy in
order to attract customers’ interests. Moreover, a game theoretical approach is an efficient way to solve a problem
in a distributed fashion with some limited shared information. Therefore, we formulate a non-cooperative game G =
[N , {Li }, {hi (·)}], where Li is the strategy set (all possible
load scheduling patterns) of player (customer hereafter for
consistency) i (the notation of a customer is changed from
n to i, which is more generic for game theoretical approach),
and hi (·) is the payoff function of customer i, which is
hi (li ) = (ΩT − pT )li ,

(29)

where Ω is a flat rate price vector if smart pricing strategy is
not applied. This payoff function shows the saving of a customer from adopting this particular DSM system. Intuitively, if
adopting a DSM system reduces their cost, customers are willing to participate. In this game, each customer calculates a best
response l⋆i with a given l−i = {l1 , . . . , li−1 , li+1 , . . . , lN }
such that,
hi (l⋆i , l−i ) ≥ hi (li , l−i ), ∀li ∈ Li .

l⋆i = arg min pT li ,

(32)

li ∈Li

s.t. Constraints (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10).
1) GA1: locally computed smart pricing.
In this approach, we assume that each customer submits
an initial load schedule l0i = {li0 (t)|t ∈ T }, ∀i ∈ N to the
control center, and then the control center broadcasts
P the initial
total load schedule L0 = {L0 (t)|t ∈ T } = i∈L l0i to the
customers. In this approach, let the price computing function
in Eq. 16 be known to all customers. Then each customer will
be able to compute the smart pricing schedule as


pi li (t)i |L0 (t), li0 (t) = pi L0 (t) − li0 (t) + li (t) , ∀t ∈ T
(33)

Let pi = {pi L0 (t) − li0 (t) + li (t) |t ∈ T }. Customer i
will need to solve the following problem to find l⋆i ,
P3 :

min pTi li ,

li ∈Li

(34)

s.t. Constraints (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10).
Lemma 5. With given l0i and L0 , P3 has a unique optimal
solution w.r.t li = {li (t)|t ∈ T }.
Proof: The objective function of P3 is analogous to that
of P2 and thus is monotonically increasing and strictly convex.
The constraint set is also compact, convex and non-empty.
Thus P3 has a unique optimal solution.
Let function g(li ) = pTi li , and Γi be the total energy
requirement for customer i. Then the optimal solution to P3
can be found by solving the necessary and sufficient conditions
of KKT [24].
Lemma 6. Let vi be the Lagrange multiplier of the equality
constraint, and vi⋆ minimizes the dual problem of P3 over vi .
The optimal solution l⋆ = {l⋆ (t)|t ∈ T } to P3 is
)
(





∂g(l)
⋆
⋆
max

, ∀t ∈ T
 l (t) = max −si− , arg ∂l(t) + v
l(t).



P ⋆


l (t) = Γi
 vi⋆ = arg
vi

t∈T

(35)

(30)

Definition 1. (Nash equilibrium (NE)): a scheduling set
l⋆ = (l⋆1 , l⋆2 , . . . , l⋆N ) is an NE of G = [N , {Li }, {hi (·)}] if,
∀i ∈ N , ∀li ∈ Li , hi (l⋆i , l⋆−i ) ≥ hi (li , l⋆−i ), where l⋆−i =
(l⋆1 , . . . , l⋆i−1 , l⋆i+1 , . . . , l⋆N ).

(31)

Lemma 7. G has a unique NE by GA1.

The best response in Eq. 30 is the same as calculating
l⋆i = arg max hi (li , l−i ),

yields a constant cost for each customer, therefore, the problem
in Eq. 31 equals the following one.

li ∈Li

s.t. Constraints (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10).
Note that Eq. 31 has an incentive physical meaning, which
is to find the set of load scheduling patterns that maximize the
energy cost saving for customer i by adopting a DSM system.
Since each customer
has a constant total daily energy
P
consumption, i.e., t li (t) = Γi , ∀i ∈ N , the flat rate price

Proof: First, the payoff function (Eq. 29) is strictly
concave, and the constraint set for this approach is compact,
convex and non-empty, thus NE exists [7], [25]. Second,
lemma 5 guarantees that the best response of each player can
be found uniquely. Therefore NE exists uniquely to GA1.
The NE of GA1 can be found by Alg. 1.
Lemma 8. Alg. 1 converges to NE.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm to find NE by GA1
max
Input: γi , ti , Ei , smax
i− , si+ , s̄i , ∀i ∈ N , T
⋆
Output: li , ∀i ∈ N ;
1: Each player computes a feasible l0i
2: while NE is not achieved do
P
0
3:
L0 ←
i∈N li ; // Computed and distributed by the
control center
4:
l0i ← l⋆i = arg P3, ∀i ∈ N ; // Computed by customer
i
5: end while
0
6: l⋆
i ← li , ∀i ∈ N ; // Output NE

Proof: According to Eq. 30, the payoff of each customer
increases after each iteration. Because the payoff is bounded,
the algorithm will converge to an equilibrium, which is the
NE.
Theorem 2. The NE of G by GA1 is also the optimal solution
to P2.
Proof: According to the definition of the best response,
we have
X
X
hi (l⋆i , l−i ) ≥
hi (li , li ), ∀li ∈ L−i
i∈N

⇒

⇒

X

i∈N

g(l⋆i , l−i ) ≤

X

g(li , l−i ), ∀li ∈ Li

i∈N

i∈N

X

g(l⋆i , l⋆−i ) ≤ PT L, ∀L ∈ L

X

(l⋆i )

(36)

i∈N

⇒pi (l⋆i , l⋆−i )

X

l⋆i ≤ PT L, ∀L ∈ L

i∈N

⇒

i∈N

= arg minPT L
L∈L

Theorem 2 demonstrates that GA1 not only favors the customers, but also minimizes the total cost and thus favors power
suppliers. So GA1 minimizes PAR according to theorem 1.
However, control center may not want to release the price
calculating function to customers. We then propose another
approach based on pre-calculated fixed pricing schedule.
2) GA2: semi-fixed smart pricing.
In this approach, each customer i also submits an initial
load schedule l0i , however the price function is hidden from
customers. Only control center is able to calculate the fixed
price vector with each L0 as,
p̃ = {p(L0 (t))|t ∈ T }.

(37)

Then each customer i will solve the following problem to
find l⋆i ,
(38)
P4 : min p̃T li ,
li ∈Li

s.t. Constraints (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10).
Note that P4 is a linear optimization problem, which can be
solved with a unique solution. However the NE for G is not
guaranteed since the objective function is no longer strictly
concave.

3) Mixed approach: adopting GA1 and GA2 based on the
property of customers.
As mentioned earlier, GA1 reveals the price function to the
customers, which may not favor the control center. The total
load is also given to all customers. However, customers who
use a significant proportion of the energy may not want to
reveal such privacy. GA2 does not have those issues but it
has no guarantee to the optimal solution of P1 or P2. In the
mixed approach, large energy consumption customers adopt
GA1 (e.g., business and industrial customers) and regular
energy consumption customers (e.g., residential customers)
adopt GA2. In the numerical analysis and simulation section
we will show that the mixed approach converges to the
minimum PAR in practice.
D. Precision and Truthfulness of the Proposed DSM Systems
Because customers could have exceptional energy consumption, one time scheduling approach [7], [8], [10] can hardly
be followed strictly. In order to increase the precision of the
proposed DSM system, the system should run at the beginning
of each time interval for the rest of the day. The control center
and the computing device of each customer (e.g., the smart
meter) should save the previous status and subtract it from
the constraints when approaching the load scheduling for the
rest of the day. With the DSM system following schedule,
and since the payment is collected after each time interval
based on the real energy usage in that interval, for P1, P2
and GA1, the minimum PAR, the minimum total cost and the
maximum local saving will only be achieved when customers
report the load schedules truthfully. The conclusion is quite
intuitive because lying about the load will deviate customers
from the optimal solution. Therefore, the truthfulness of the
proposed DSM systems should be guaranteed.
V. N UMERICAL A NALYSIS

AND

S IMULATION R ESULTS

A. Setting for the numerical analysis
Assume that power suppliers are available to support customers with any energy requirement. The control center is able
to gather/distribute information from/to the power suppliers
and the customers in real-time (e.g., 100 ms). The customers
are categorized into residential, business and industrial types.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the daily energy
consumption of the customers follows the proportions obtained
from the data in Fig. 2. Specifically, as shown in Fig. 4,
residential customers consist of three types (i.e., families in big
houses, families in townhouses, families in apartments), each
with 55 kW h, 41 kW h and 33 kW h daily average energy
consumption respectively. Each residential customer type has
50 customers. Business customers have two types (i.e., daytime based business and shopping malls), each with 2400 kW h
and 2700 kW h daily average energy consumption respectively, and each type has 1 customer. Industrial customers have two
types (i.e., non-stop shift-based manufacturers and day-time
based industry), each with 2100 kW h and 2500 kW h daily
average energy consumption respectively, and each type has 1
customer. Note that the settings for the customers are flexible
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Daily energy consumption (kWh).

TABLE II
S ETTING FOR THE CASE STUDY.
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customers tend to sell extra energy from their storage unit
to maximize the savings.
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Daily consumption of the customers.
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Power usage (kWh).

600

as long as the total energy consumption of each category
follows the practical data.
The granularity of time intervals is important to the DSM
system. As shown in Fig. 5, when |T | = 24, the total load
of the power grid is constant throughout the day while it
fluctuates when |T | = 8.
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(b) |T | = 8.

Solution to P1 with different T .

Part of the detailed initial settings for residential customers
are shown in Table II. We assume that each storage unit is able
to hold 1/6 of daily power usage, each family has 2 PHEVs for
type 1 and type 2 residential customers, the customers living
in apartment have 1 PHEV each. Each PHEV holds 9kW h
electricity. The power usage and rough schedules for other
appliances are estimations based on day-to-day experiences.
For simplicity, the on/off schedule is shown as start/end time.
Note that some of the appliances are observed as multiple
ones so that the modeling is more precise, for example AC
for residential users is observed as an all-day ventilation and
a fully operating one in the afternoon.
B. Comparison of P1, P2 and GA1
Fig. 6 shows that the P1, P2 and GA1 all reach the same
optimal result w.r.t the total load. However, each customer
receives a different load scheduling. This is observed in all
three DSM systems. Fig. 7 shows the results for residential
customers. Note that GA1 leads to a negative load for some
customers as shown in Fig. 7(c). It indicates that those
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C. Comparison of Different Distributed Approaches.

Fig. 11.

Fig. 10 shows the load scheduling results of GA1, GA2,
mixed GA and a distributed approach when all customers
intend to minimize their local PAR. From the simulation
results we can see that both GA1 and mixed GA converge
to the optimal PAR while neither GA2 nor min local PAR
minimizes PAR.

impact. Therefore, both business and industrial customers must
schedule their loads in a more fluctuating way to adapt to the
residential load.

GA2 illustration.
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In fact, GA2 performs the worst in the simulation when all
customers are considered. Because of the fixed given smart
price, customers will shift their load to the low price time
intervals without considering the consequence of doing so.
When all customers do so, the time intervals with a relative
low previous load will be scheduled with a higher load and
the price will go up. Then customers will shift back based
on the updated price schedule. The simulation also indicates
that GA2 alone fluctuates between these two states without
converging to the NE. Fig. 11 shows the two states of the
total load schedule by GA2 for the first 8 time intervals.
Fig. 12 shows the average load schedules by GA1 and
mixed GA for the first type of the customers in each category.
It appears that GA1 schedules a smoother load for each
customer because residential customers have better assessments of the cost changes based on their updated schedule
by GA1. When applying mixed GA, although each customer
does not affect the price much, they together still cause a big

Fig. 13 shows that both GA1 and mixed GA converge
quickly to the NE. In game theoretical approaches, the uplink
of the network transmits the load schedule of each customer to
the control center, and the control center broadcasts the total
load schedule to all customers. Although it requires multiple iterations, it requires much less data transmission compared with
the centralized approach, which needs much more detailed data
from the customers and the scheduled appliance load must
be delivered to each customer individually. Moreover, it is
worth mentioning that the energy providers may not want to
declare the true cost function to all the customers in practice.
By adopting mixed GA, only a few customers are required to
know the cost function and some confidential agreements can
be made.
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D. The Impact from Storage Unit
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Fig. 16. (a) The estimation of the proportion of different power suppliers
and (b) the corresponding total cost estimation of year 2014, 2018 and 2020.
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P1 and P2 fail to protect the customer privacy and the
communication overhead is too high to be deployed for a
real-time system. We further proposed two smart pricingbased game theoretical approaches GA1 and GA2 to address
the shortcomings of P1 and P2. We successfully proved
that both P2 and GA1, where each customer calculates the
dynamic price locally, reach the solution to P1 (min PAR).
In the numerical analysis and the simulations, we further
demonstrated the results, and compared several distributed
approaches. In the future work, detachable micro grids and
customer-side power generator will be considered for a more
precise modeling of the DSM system. Other schemes where
the true cost function is hidden from the customers will also
be studied.
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2014
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From Fig. 14 we can see that the total load schedule is no
longer a straight line without the assistance of storage units.
And this causes a higher PAR for the power grid, as shown
in Fig. 15. However, a storage unit may not necessarily help
reduce the PAR for each customer individually.

R1

R2

R3

B1

B2

I1

I2

Total

PAR without storage units.

E. The Impact from Increasing Renewable Energy
In Fig. 16(a), we show the estimated proportion of different
power suppliers based on the data in Fig. 3 up to year 2020.
Based on the estimations, the total energy cost of the customers
in 2014, 2018 and 2020 is shown in Fig. 16(b). Clearly, the
expanding renewable energy helps reducing the energy cost.
VI. C ONCLUSION

AND

F UTURE W ORK

In this paper, we studied DSM in smart grid. In order to
motivate and benefit all parties including the whole society
(environment), power suppliers and customers, we proposed
several approaches for the DSM system. First, P1 directly
minimizes PAR. Second, a DLC-based cost minimization
approach P2 motivates the power suppliers. However both
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